Provability semantics suggests well-principled notions of constructive truth and constructive falsity of classical sentences in Peano arithmetic PA: F is constructively true iff PA proves F ; F is constructively false iff PA proves 'for each x, there is a proof that x is not a proof of F .' We also consider an associated notion of constructive consistency of PA, CCon PA , 'for each x, there is a proof that x is not a proof of 0 = 1.' We show that PA proves CCon PA hence there is no a Gödel-style impossibility barrier for case-by-case consistency proofs. Furthermore, we prove a finitary version of constructive consistency directly:
Consistency problem: lost in translation
Hilbert's consistency program of the 1920s (cf. [28] ) was asking for a finitary demonstration that in a formal theory such as PA any finite sequence S of formulas is not a derivation of a contradiction.
(
This is a mathematical problem (provided "finitary" is given a mathematical meaning) depending on a parameter S ranging over finite sequences of formulas. Impossibility of finitary proofs of consistency, usually attributed to Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem, G2, is largely a myth based on an uncritical metamathematical interpretation of its mathematical result. Indeed, derivations in PA are finite sequences of formulas. Gödel's arithmetization encodes derivations by numbers, which is fine due to constructive and epistemically unproblematic coding/decoding procedures.
However, the next step of arithmetization, that of using numeric quantifiers to represent universal properties of derivations, introduces serious aberrations. Arithmetical formula Con PA , for all x, x is not a code of a proof of 0 = 1, does not represent Hilbert's notion of consistency of PA-derivations fairly. Due to wellknown expressivity limitations in PA, the universal quantifier spills over to nonstandard proof codes, and hence Con PA stating consistency of both standard and nonstandard proof codes is just too strong for (1) . If Con PA is true in all models of PA, then (1) holds. The converse, however, does not hold. So, the result of G2, that PA cannot prove Con PA , does not actually block finitary consistency proofs for standard PA-derivations as formulated in Hilbert's consistency program.
Moreover, as we show in this paper, once standard derivations are represented fairly by an input parameter S as in (1) rather than by an indiscriminate universal quantifier over proof codes as in Con PA , no problems with finitary consistency proofs in PA occur. We establish by a direct finitary reasoning that for any given finite sequence of arithmetical sentences S there is a finitary proof p(S) that S is not a derivation of a contradiction.
Namely, for any PA-derivation S, a standard partial truth definition analysis bounded by complexity of formulas from S establishes that S does not contain 0 = 1. This demonstrates PA-consistency by finitary means. An obvious feature of (2) is that we are producing a finitely generated series of finitary proofs p(S) and, by G2, these proofs do not collapse into one uniform PA-proof of consistency.
So what? "Finitary" does not mean "finite." In limited languages such as propositional, first-order, arithmetical languages, etc., we are fated to live with some well-defined infinite collections of finite constructive objects. Logical axioms and induction axioms in PA constitute constructively generated infinite families of formulas, and for over a hundred years we naturally accept these objects as finitary. We do not dismiss PA as not well defined just because it requires an infinite series of induction axioms.
The case-by-case finitary proofs p(S) from (2) have the same status: they are constructively described finite objects each of which can be shaped as a formal mathematical proof formalizable in PA. From this perspective, solution (2) fits Hilbert's desiderata (1) .
We establish a connection of (2) with the theory of constructive truth and constructive falsity of arithmetical sentences inspired by Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics [11, 25] and its formalization in the Logic of Proofs [3, 5, 6] . This connection provides a bigger picture and explains how constructive consistency and its finitary version (2) were able to circumvent some limitations on consistency proofs imposed by Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem.
It appears that despite a long history of suggestions to bypass Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem (cf. [13, 14, 15, 28] ), this case-by-case approach to proving consistency when embedded into a general theory of constructive truth, falsity, and consistency is well-principled and offers a new substance. If so, this vindicates, to some extent, Hilbert's program of establishing consistency of formal theories and reopens the door to the study of similar consistency proofs for other theories.
Findings
By no means are we casting doubt upon Gödelian consistency studies, ordinal analysis, etc.; these are the classics of mathematical logic.
However, as far as foundations are concerned, viewing Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems as blocking the very possibility of proving consistency internally is an unfortunate misconception which we suggest resisting.
Gödel's consistency formula Con PA is (much) stronger than the consistency property (1) of a given theory. The fact that Con PA is not provable does in PA not rule out another perfectly fine possibility reflected in the constructive consistency idea: to have a case-by-case internal consistency proof for each derivation. We show that this possibility can be realized for Peano arithmetic: we offer a finitary consistency proof for PA based on partial truth definitions.
We did not start with inspecting the conditions of Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem and trying to weaken some of them in order to dodge its impossibility conclusion. Our staring point was the foundational problem in its entirety:
Can mathematical theories establish consistency of their own formalizations?
The prevailing wisdom so far has been "No, by Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem, unless such a theory is inconsistent." We offer a new foundational answer to (3):
Mathematical theories can prove consistency of their own formalizations.
In particular, this dismantles the reflection tower of theories of increasing metamathematical strength as the 'only true' foundational picture.
2. irrelevance of witnesses: if ¬A holds, then any p is a dummy BHK-proof of ¬A.
These features are counterintuitive and undermine the very basic principles of constructive semantics; they were subject of criticism by Kreisel, so-called Kreisel's second clause (cf. [12] ). Gödel in [16] endorsed classical modal logic S4 as the calculus of provability in which ✷A informally represents 'A is provable':
• Axioms and rules of classical propositional logic,
Gödel connected classical provability with intuitionistic logic IPC in a way that respects the provability reading of the latter:
where tr(F ) is obtained by 'boxing' each subformula of F . At that stage, a provability semantics for IPC seemed to reduce to a provability semantics for S4. However, as it was noticed by Gödel, S4 endorses reflection principle ✷F → F, not compatible with the straightforward reading of ✷ as formal provability.
The main idea to overcome this difficulty was to use the language of explicit proof terms and a logic of proofs in lieu of modal language for provability and S4. Indeed, if p:F is the proof formula 'p is a proof of F ,' then the explicit version of factivity is internally provable
In the Logic of Proofs LP, cf. [3, 5, 6] , proofs are represented by proof terms constructed from proof variables and proof constants by means of functional symbols for elementary computable operations on proofs, binary ·, +, and unary !. Formulas are built by Boolean connectives from propositional atoms and those of the form t:F where t is a proof term and F is a formula.
LP has the axioms and rules of classical logic along with: The principal feature of LP is its natural arithmetical semantics, according to which t:F is interpreted as 't is a proof of F . ' Furthermore, LP has the ability to realize all S4 theorems by restoring corresponding proof terms inside occurrences of modality. A forgetful projection of an LP-formula F is a modal formula obtained by replacing all assertions t:(·) in F by ✷(·).
Realization Theorem [2, 3] : S4 is the forgetful projection of LP.
That the forgetful projection of LP is S4-compliant is a straightforward observation. The converse has been first established by presenting an algorithm which substitutes proof terms for all occurrences of modalities in a cut-free Gentzen-style S4-derivation of a formula F , thereby producing a formula F r derivable in LP. The resulting realization respects Skolem's idea that negative occurrences of existential quantifiers over proofs (hidden in the modality of provability) are realized by free proof variables whereas positive occurrences are realized by functions of those variables.
Realization Theorem provides an exact semantics for S4 in LP. To complete building a provability BHK semantics for IPC it is now sufficient to note that LP has a natural interpretation as a logic of formal proofs in Peano arithmetic PA or a similar system capable of encoding its own proofs:
where each ֒→ is an embedding.
Realization Theorem prompts reasoning in S4 and automatically produces the corresponding LP-reasoning. Let us try to view the negation problem in the original BHK through S4. Let A be atomic. In the original BHK setting, ¬A which is A → ⊥ holds iff ✷A → ✷⊥, i.e., equivalently in S4, ¬✷A.
This means 'A has no proofs' and yields the aforementioned trivialization and irrelevance of witnesses distortions. Coincidentally, S4/LP-based BHK semantics of negation and implication is compliant with the Kreisel second clause criticism (cf. [6, 12] ) which requires an additional provability condition
✷¬✷A.
In a general BHK setting, the suggested refining of the BHK clause for implication is
Let A be atomic. In the S4/LP-based BHK, we first Gödel-translate ¬A:
✷¬✷A.
Then we realize the result in LP respecting polarities:
v(x):¬x:A for some proof term v(x). This reads v(x) is a proof that x is not a proof of A.
Such adjusted semantics cures trivialization and irrelevance of witnesses defects.
Constructive truth, falsity and consistency
Can intuitionistic approach provide new insights on what is constructive in classical mathematics? As usual, we will ignore difference between a syntactic object X, its Gödel number X and the corresponding arithmetical numeral X when safe. Let t:Y be a shorthand for the standard formula Proof (t, Y ) stating that 't is a proof of Y in PA,' ✷Y stand for Provable(Y ), i.e., ∃x(x:Y ). For details, cf. [9, 17, 18, 23, 24] .
We use ⊥ for the propositional constant "false" which in the arithmetical context can be equivalently read as 0 = 1. We stay on the common sense mathematical ground which assumes soundness of PA with respect to the standard model of arithmetic.
Traditionally, intuitionism reads an arithmetical sentence F in a constructive manner. This however could alter the meaning of F . Our idea is to preserve the classical meaning of F so we don't venture "inside" F and treat F as atomic for a BHK-style interpretation.
Informally, F should be BHK-true as an intuitionistic atom. By S4/LP realization this means that PA proves t:F for some t which is equivalent to PA ⊢ F .
F is constructively false iff
Conceptually, we read 'F yields ⊥' intuitionistically in a BHK fashion and conclude that for some v(x), PA ⊢ ∀x v(x):¬x:F
By some proof theory, (5) is equivalent to '(6) holds for some provably total computable term v(x).' Indeed, (6) obvioulsy yields (5). Assume (5). We can describe v(x) informally. Since u:F is decidable, given x, enumerate proofs in PA until a proof of ¬x:F is met. Since PA ⊢ ∀x∃y(y:¬x:F ), v(x) is provably total.
Gödel's consistency formula, Con PA , is
Definition 2 Constructive consistency is a formula CCon PA stating that for each number it is provable that it is not a proof of a contradiction:
Theorem 1 PA proves its own constructive consistency:
Proof. First, we check that
Indeed, note that PA ⊢ ✷⊥ → ✷¬x:⊥. By generalization,
Indeed, by first-order logic, PA ⊢ x:⊥ → ∃x(x:⊥), hence PA ⊢ ¬✷⊥ → ¬x:⊥.
By Σ 1 -completeness of PA, cf. [24] , PA ⊢ ¬x:F → ✷¬x:F , hence PA ⊢ ¬✷⊥ → ✷¬x:F . By generalization, ¬✷⊥ → ∀x✷¬x:⊥ (= CCon PA ).
✷
To the extent to which constructive consistency CCon PA can be accepted as a possible formalization of the notion of consistency of PA, Theorem 1 removes Gödel's impossibility spell from the idea of proving consistency internally. However, Theorem 1 alone does not provide a finitary consistency proof for PA. We discuss these foundational matters in the Section 5
Holy Grail consistency and Hilbert's program
Holy Grail consistency (HG-consistency) of PA is the property any finite sequence S of formulas is not a derivation of a contradiction which is identical with Hilbert's specification (1) for PA, we are just giving it a name.
HG-consistency for PA is not directly formalizable by a single arithmetical formula in which derivations in PA are represented by their codes since standard natural numbers are not definable in PA.
So, is HG-consistency of PA provable by finitary means?
5.1 Unprovability of Con PA is not an answer
Despite widespread opinion, Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem does not answer (7). The consistency formula for PA Con PA = ∀x¬x:⊥, yields HG-consistency but not the other way around. Semantically, ∀x¬x:⊥ claims that in no model (possibly nonstandard) of PA is there any number (possibly nonstandard) that encodes a proof of a contradiction. So, Con PA is a kind of uniform consistency which looks stronger than HG-consistency, and IS in fact stronger, since HG-consistency can be established by finitary means, cf. Sectionr 6, but Con PA cannot.
Provability of
CCon PA in PA is not an answer either
If the consistency formula ∀x¬x:⊥ were internally provable, this would yield that PA ⊢ p:∀x¬x:⊥ for some proof p. By G2, this is not possible. Constructive consistency offers a more flexible approach: it allows the aforementioned certification p to depend on x, p = p(x) and asks whether PA ⊢ ∀x p(x):¬x:⊥.
In a general form this is a question of whether PA ⊢ ∀x∃y(y:¬x:⊥),
i.e. PA ⊢ CCon PA which was answered affirmatively in Theorem 1. However, the argument HG-consistency of PA is finitarily provable because PA ⊢ CCon PA is circular since it relies on soundness of PA and hence does not actually prove HGconsistency of PA. After all, any inconsistent T proves its own constructive consistency. Theorem 1 does not produce a real mathematical proof of HG-consistency. In a formalization process we take a mathematical proof and formalize it as a formal derivation in a given theory; logicians have learned how to do this. If such a formalization is possible, then a correct mathematical proof yields a correct formal derivation.
With PA ⊢ CCon PA we are facing the opposite problem, deformalization: given that a sentence is formally provable in a theory T , produce a rigorous mathematical proof of this statement. This does not necessarily work, e.g., when T is inconsistent, or T is not sound, like PA + ¬Con PA , etc. Deformalization can work when T is sound, but the assumption of soundness of T is stronger than the goal, consistency of F . So deformalization is useless for proving consistency and we have to do it in the reverse order: a mathematical proof of HG-consistency of PA first, and its formalization in PA second.
Sufficient conditions for finitary HG-consistency proofs
To establish HG-consistency of PA by finitary tools one has 1. for each PA-proof S to provide a mathematically rigorous proof that S does not prove 0 = 1;
2. check that all constructions and their properties used in the proof are finitary. In the current context, this requirement is often interpreted as "formalizable in PA."
Alone, neither of 1 nor 2 is sufficient for claiming a finitary proof of HG-consistency. Indeed, the provability of constructive consistency as demonstrated in Theorem 1 secures 2, but not 1. It does not provide a mathematical proof that no derivation in PA derives a contradiction; it rather shows that constructive consistency holds in PA regardless to whether PA is consistent or not.
The classical soundness-in-the-standard-model argument proves HG-consistency and hence satisfies 1, but uses tools not formalizable in PA (hence does not satisfy 2). Indeed, all axioms of PA are true in the standard model of arithmetic, the logical rules respect arithmetical truth, hence 0 = 1 being not true cannot be derived in PA. This is a valid mathematical argument which is quite sufficient for a "normal" mathematician. However, it speaks about "truth in the standard model" which is not formalizable in PA due to limited expressiveness of the first-order language (which for a "normal" mathematician might look like a mere technicality).
Finitary proof of Holy Grail Consistency
Although the internal provability of constructive consistency alone does not settle the question of finitary demonstration of HG-consistency, it suggests looking for finitary case-by-case proofs. Such case-by-case approach is native for PA; after all, the induction principle there is represented by case-by-case schemas of first-order formulas rather than by a single formula.
Once we know what to look for, finitary case-by-case proofs of Holy Grail consistency readily suggest themselves. Here is one.
In metamathematics of first-order arithmetic, there is a well-known construction called partial truth definitions, cf. [10, 17, 18, 21, 24] . Namely, for each n = 0, 1, 2, . . . we inductively build a Σ n+1 formula Tr n (x, y) called truth definition for Σ n formulas which satisfies natural properties of a truth predicate. When ϕ is a Σ n -formula and y is a sequence encoding values of the parameters in ϕ then Tr n ( ϕ , y) defines the truth value of ϕ on y.
Let y be a code of a finite sequence of numbers and y i denote the i-th number in y. Then the following conditions hold ( [10, 17, 18, 21, 24] ):
Lemma 1
• Tr n ( ϕ , y) satisfies the usual properties of truth with respect to boolean connectives, quantifiers, and rule Modus Ponens for each ϕ ∈ Σ n , and these properties are naturally derivable using Σ n+1 induction.
• PA naturally proves Tarksi's condition for any Σ n -formula ϕ:
Tr n ( ϕ , y) ≡ ϕ(y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y k ).
In particular, ¬Tr n ( 0 = 1 ) is naturally provable.
• Tr n ( A , y) is naturally provable for any axiom A of PA of depth ≤ n.
Note that all the proofs in Lemma 1 are valid finitary arguments, which are mathematically rigorous by their own natural merits. So, Lemma 1 does not make any metamathematical assumptions about PA, and just uses a formal language of PA for rigorous bookkeeping.
Given a finite sequence S of formulas which is a legitimate PA-derivation, we first calculate n such that all formulas from S have depth ≤ n. Then, by a step by step induction on the length of S we check that for any formula ϕ in S with parameters y, the property Tr n ( ϕ , y) holds. This is an immediate corollary of Lemma 1, since all PA-axioms satisfy Tr n and each instance of Modus Ponens respects Tr n as well. So, Tr n serves as an invariant for all formulas from S. Since, by Lemma 1, 0 = 1 does not satisfy Tr n , 0 = 1 cannot occur in S.
We argue that this proof satisfies the desiderata for a finitary proof of Holy Grail consistency.
1. This is a mathematical proof by normal standards of rigor acceptable for a general mathematician.
2. The constructions and required properties used in this argument are formalizable in PA: partial truth definitions, compliance of truth definitions with PA-derivation rules, etc. Hence for each PA-derivation S, we have proved in PA that S does not contain 0 = 1.
Note that this argument cannot be strengthened to establish provability of Gödel's (uniform) consistency Con PA = ∀x¬x:⊥ because, by Tarski's Theorem, there is no one truth definition in PA that covers all formulas.
7 Proof theory of constructive truth and falsity
Normal forms
First, we find a provably equivalent quantifier-free formulation of constructive falsity which we call "normal forms."
The negation of the constructive falsity sentence,
is a kind of a provability predicate which is true iff F is provable. The details will be clear after the following Hence ∀x✷¬x:F which is ¬(8). This proves the " → " direction. Now assume ¬✷⊥ and ✷F . Then ∃x(x:F ) and, by Σ 1 -completeness, ∃x✷x:F . Let t be such an x, i.e., ✷t:F . We claim that ¬✷¬t:F , since otherwise we would have ✷t:¬F and ✷t:F which yields ✷⊥. So, ∃x¬✷¬x:F . ✷
Theorem 2 [Normal Form Theorem] F is constructively false iff
Proof. By definition, F is constructively false iff PA ⊢ ¬(8) which, by Lemma 2, is equivalent to PA ⊢ ¬✷⊥ → ¬✷F , i.e., PA ⊢ Con PA → ¬✷F . ✷ Equivalent forms of constructive falsity of F are PA ⊢ ¬✷⊥ → ¬✷F , PA ⊢ ✷F → ✷⊥.
Sanity Theorem
The following Sanity Theorem demonstrates that constructive truth/falsity satisfy natural desired properties. The main idea of these notions is to provide constructive BHKstyle refinement of the classical truth values of arithmetical formulas which respects arithmetical provability and refutability 1 . The list of these natural properties corresponds to 1-5 of Sanity Theorem. Items 1-3 are straightforward, item 4 is a non-triviality requirement, item 5 shows that constructive truth/falsity respect arithmetical provability internally, at the level of provable implications.
Note that other natural BHK-inspired formalizations of constructively true/false do not seem to pass this sanity test. For example, taking PA ⊢ ✷¬✷F for "F is constructively false" does not satisfy 2 with ⊥ as F .
Theorem 3 [Sanity Theorem]
1. PA ⊢ F yields 'F is constructively true'; 2. PA ⊢ ¬F yields 'F is constructively false'; 3. 'constructively true' and 'constructively false' are mutually exclusive; 4. 'constructively true/false' do not coincide with 'provable/refutable'; 5. 'constructively true' and 'constructively false' are monotone in the Lindenbaum algebra of PA: if PA ⊢ F → G, then
• 'F is constructively true' yields 'G is constructively true,'
• 'G is constructively false' yields 'F is constructively false.'
Proof.
1. By definitions, PA ⊢ F iff 'F is constructively true.'
2. Let PA ⊢ ¬F . Then PA ⊢ ✷¬F and, by modal-style reasoning, PA ⊢ ✷F → ✷⊥. Note that if F is constructively true, then, by 2, ¬F is constructively false. However, if F is constructively false, then ¬F can be either constructively true (e.g., when F is 0 = 1), or constructively false (e.g., when F is ¬R from Theorem 5), or neither (e.g., F is Con PA , by Lemma 3 and Theorem 4).
3. Suppose F is constructively true and false. Then PA ⊢ F and PA ⊢ ✷F → ✷⊥, hence PA ⊢ ✷F and PA ⊢ ✷⊥ which contradicts soundness of PA with respect to the standard model. 4 . It suffices to find a formula which is true (hence not refutable) but constructively false.
Lemma 3 Consistency formula Con PA = ¬✷⊥ is true and constructively false.
Proof. Con PA is true in the standard model since PA is sound, hence consistent. Furthermore, since, by the formalized Löb Theorem (cf. [9, 24] ),
Con PA is constructively false. ✷ So, Con PA is constructively false but not refutable.
5. In the Lindenbaum algebra of PA,
constructive truth is closed downward (immediate) and constructive falsehood is closed upward. Indeed, suppose PA ⊢ F → G, then PA ⊢ ✷F → ✷G. If, in addition, G is constructively false, then PA ⊢ ✷G → ✷⊥ which yields PA ⊢ ✷F → ✷⊥ as well. ✷
Inconsistency is not constructively false.
Theorem 4 Inconsistency ¬Con PA = ✷⊥ is not constructively false.
Proof. Immediate from Normal Form Theorem 2, since PA ⊢ ✷✷⊥ → ✷⊥: otherwise, by Löb's Theorem, PA ⊢ ✷⊥ which is not the case. ✷ So, inconsistency formula ¬Con PA is neither constructively false, nor constructively true.
Rosser sentences
By Rosser's Theorem, there is a sentence R, for which independence in PA follows from simple consistency of PA: if PA is consistent, then nether R nor its negation ¬R is provable, cf. [23] .
Theorem 5 Rosser sentence R and its negation ¬R are both constructively false.
Proof. The proof of Rosser's Theorem is syntactic and can be formalized in PA, cf. [27] :
By Normal Form Theorem 2, both R and ¬R are constructively false. ✷
Constructive liar sentence
Theorem 6 There is a true independent in PA sentence which is not constructively false.
Proof. Using the fixed-point lemma, find an arithmetic sentence L such that
If PA ⊢ L, then PA ⊢ ✷L and, by (9) , PA ⊢ ✷⊥ which is not the case. If PA ⊢ ¬L, then, by Sanity Theorem item 2, L is constructively false, hence, PA ⊢ ✷L → ✷⊥. By the fixed point (9), PA ⊢ L -a contradiction in PA. So, L is independent and not constructively false.
Note that L is classically true: otherwise ✷L is false and ✷L → ✷⊥ is vacuously true. By the fixed point (9), L ought to be true as well. ✷
Summary table of classical and constructive truth/falsity
Here is the summary table of possible overlaps of classical and constructive truth/falsity.
Intersection of classes Example
True and constructively true 0 = 0 True and constructively false Con PA , R True and neither Constructive Liar L False and constructively true ∅ False and constructively false 0 = 1, ¬R False and neither ¬Con PA
Constructive truth/falsity of dual pairs
Consider dual pairs of arithmetical sentences F and ¬F . If one of them is constructively true, hence provable, then the other one is refutable, hence constructively false. We show that any combinations 'constructively false' (we call it case f ) and 'neither constructively true nor constructively false' (case n) are possible for dual pairs of arithmetical sentences.
Case {f, f } is realized by Rosser sentences R and ¬R, cf. Theorem 5.
Case {f, n}, subcase F is true is realized by F = Con PA , cf. Lemma 3 and Theorem 4. Let us do case {f, n}, subcase F is false.
Lemma 4
There is an arithmetical sentence F which is false and constructively false whereas ¬F is neither constructively true nor constructively false.
Proof. Consider F = ¬✷⊥ ∧ ✷✷⊥. In a different notation, F is nothing but
F is false, since ✷✷⊥ is false. F is constructively false. By Normal Form Theorem 2, it suffices to check that PA ⊢ ✷F → ✷⊥. Argue in PA: ✷F implies ✷¬✷⊥ which, by the formalized Löb Theorem, yields ✷⊥.
¬F is neither constructively true nor constructively false. Indeed, in PA, ¬F is equivalent to ✷✷⊥ → ✷⊥ which is not provable in PA, since otherwise, by Löb Theorem PA would prove ✷⊥. Therefore, ¬F is not constructively true.
To check that ¬F is not constructively false, it suffices to prove that PA ⊢ ✷¬F → ✷⊥. In PA, ✷¬F is equivalent to ✷(✷✷⊥ → ✷⊥), which, by the formalized Löb Theorem and some modal-style reasoning in PA is equivalent to ✷✷⊥. So, the problem has been reduced to checking that ✷✷⊥ → ✷⊥ is not derivable in PA. If it were, then, by Löb Theorem, PA would derive ✷⊥ which is not the case. ✷
Let us now do case {n, n}.
Lemma 5
There is an arithmetical sentence F such that both F and ¬F are neither constructively true nor constructively false.
Proof. It suffices to find F such that both F and ¬F are not constructively false, by the aforementioned discussion in this section, then neither F nor ¬F can be constructively true. So, by Normal Form Theorem 2, we need to find an F such that PA ⊢ ✷F → ✷⊥ and PA ⊢ ✷¬F → ✷⊥. To find such an F , we use the technique developed within the framework of the Provability Logic GL, cf. [4, 9, 24] . In particular, we will need the uniform arithmetical completeness theorem for GL established independently in [1, 7, 8, 20, 26] .
Lemma 6 [Uniform Arithmetical Completeness of Provability Logic]
There is an arithmetical interpretation * such that for any modal formula M,
Lemma 7 GL ⊢ ✷p → ✷⊥ and GL ⊢ ✷¬p → ✷⊥ for a propositional letter p.
Proof. By soundness of GL with respect to arithmetical interpretations, it suffices to deliver arithmetical sentences X and Y such that PA ⊢ ✷X → ✷⊥ and PA ⊢ ✷¬Y → ✷⊥. Obviously, X = ⊥ → ⊥ and Y = ¬X work: they both reduce to showing that PA ⊢ ✷(⊥ → ⊥) → ✷⊥ which is equivalent to PA ⊢ ✷⊥ and obvious. ✷ By Lemma 6, there is an arithmetical sentence p * such that both PA ⊢ ✷p * → ✷⊥ and PA ⊢ ✷¬p * → ✷⊥. ✷
Beyond arithmetic
What about case-by-case consistency of other theories containing PA? Each of these theories proves its own constructive consistency (as in Theorem 1). That being said, a more nuanced a priori analysis can be provided.
Assume that theory T provably contains PA and let '✷ T ' and ': T ' denote provability and proof predicates respectively for T . Consider formulas
• Consistency: Con T = ∀x¬x: T ⊥;
• Finitary consistency: FCon T = ∀x✷ P A ¬x: T ⊥;
• Constructive consistency:
It is easy to check that PA proves
Obviously, PA ⊢ Con T .
Theorem 7 PA ⊢ CCon T .
Proof. Indeed, argue in PA. If ✷ T ⊥, then vacuously ✷ T ¬x: T ⊥ and hence ∀x✷ T ¬x: T ⊥. Therefore,
If ¬✷ T ⊥, then ∀x¬x: T ⊥ and, by Σ 1 -completeness of PA, ∀x✷ PA ¬x: T ⊥. Therefore,
✷ The question of whether PA proves FCon T is related to the question of whether there is a finitary proof of case-by-case consistency of T . In particular, if for each S we can provide a finitary proof that S is not a T -proof of a contradiction and this procedure is formalizable in PA, PA should be able to prove ∀x✷ P A ¬x: T ⊥.
The following Theorem 8 and Corollary 1 are due to Morgan Sinclaire [22] (private communication on Feb 22, 2019 , discussing the first arxiv posting of this paper). They show limits of how far we can go with proving finitary consistency. Furthermore, Morgan Sinclaire [22] and Taishi Kurahashi [19] in independent private communications have pointed out that FCon T is PA-provably equivalent to
Con PA → Con T which can be established by the same reasoning as in the proof of Normal Form Theorem 2. This observation also immediately implies Theorem 8 and Corollary 1.
As a corollary, we conclude that, generally speaking, neither of converse implications from (10) holds. Indeed, for T = PA, PA ⊢ FCon T (by Theorem 7), but PA ⊢ Con T (by G2). For T = PA + Con PA , PA ⊢ CCon T (by Theorem 7), but PA ⊢ FCon T (by Theorem 8) .
The results of this section show how much we can get by switching to case-by-case consistency. In Section 6 we demonstrated case-by-case consistency of PA by finitary tools. By Theorem 7, it is not impossible for any theory T containing PA to prove its case-by-case consistency, and this fact itself, in the form of CCon T , is provable at the low, PA-level. So, there are no Gödelian roadblocks on the path to internal proofs of consistency of theories; this can be regarded as a main message of this paper.
However, within the current circle of ideas, there are Gödel-style limitations on finitary consistency proofs p(S) for each derivation S in a theory T provably containing PA + Con PA : they need methods spilling over PA.
